Air Power in the Gulf War
With the US-Iran war kicking off, I was looking some stuff about the first Gulf War and stumbled onto this article which seems quite relevant and prescient.
The Myth of Air Power in the Gulf War
The implication of my analysis for U.S. foreign policy is that air power may play a decisive role in future U.S. operations to halt an enemy's mechanized assault on a U.S. ally. It will not likely be decisive, however, if the United States or its allies need to conduct an offensive to take enemy-controlled territory. For example, if North Korea attacks South Korea, or if Iraq invades Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, U.S. air assets may play a leading role in the destruction of the invading forces. But if the U.S. objective in these contingencies is to launch a counteroffensive into North Korea, or to once again evict Iraq from Kuwait, air power will be far less effective against defensively oriented North Korean, or Iraqi, forces. The force structure implications of this analysis are straightforward: If the United States envisions launching offensive operations to defeat its enemies, it will still require a balanced military that includes substantial heavy ground forces. Overemphasizing air assets may prove very costly.
The general gist and breakdown is:
Did Air Power Prevent the Iraqis From Maneuvering? No. During the ground war virtually all of Iraq's mobile divisions, comprising almost all their combat power, were able to manoeuvre. Of nine heavy divisions of the regular army in the Kuwait theatre, two counter-attacked to the south, two moved west to block the left-hook, and four retreated north after the general retreat was ordered, leaving only one not moving and it was overrun by ground forces within hours of opening hostilities.
Did Air Power Sever Iraqi C3I? It was significantly degraded, however, the Iraqi Army was able to effectively identify the 'left-hook' manoeuvre within six hours and then mobilise a response to it the next day.
Did Air Power Cut Iraqi Supply Lines? The ground offensive overran supply dumps totaling thousands of bunkers filled with food, fuel and ammunition, adequate to last at least a month. The situation on the front line forces was significantly worse (manned by the weakest elements, predominately Kurdish and Shi'a conscripts) and these forces weren't really expected to really do anything but help shape where the regular army or republican guard would respond to.
Did Air Attacks Attrit the Iraqis Too Heavily for Them to Resist? The air battle attrited up to 40% of Iraqi armour, however they were still able to face the Americans in a number of battles with a strong ratio for being on the defensive. In four major battles, for example, Iraqis were outnumbered 1.5:1 in one, on equal footing in two, and outnumbered America 1.5:1 in the fourth. (Note: 'standard' logic is to have 3:1 troops when advancing against defenders). Despite these ratios, Iraq killed a single US soldier and lost over 250 armoured vehicles. In the initial engagement against Marines to the South, Iraq had equal numbers of forces to the US, but lost >100 vehicles and killed zero (0) Marines.
Did Air Power Break Iraqi Morale? During the ground war, the Republican Guard and the heavy divisions of the Iraqi army received and obeyed orders to maneuovre and fight against the 'left-hook', which they obeyed. The ones that retreated were following orders to do so. The Frontline Infantry shattered on first contact, and air bombardment surely played a role in this, but the more professional and better supported troops maintained morale after five weeks of heavy bombardment.
To summarise, the article basically concludes that even if there had been little air campaign prior to the ground offensive, the Iraqi's would have seen "a rout of historic proportions" and that the Coalition may have faced "maybe an additional 20-200 dead." Basically the ground forces were so unevenly matched, that the air campaign contributed only marginally to the outcome
The consistent pattern across all of the battles is that greater numbers of Iraqi forces simply produced greater numbers of Iraqi casualties. This suggests that had there been 40 percent more Iraqi tanks in these battles (i.e., had the air war not happened), there would have been 40 percent more Iraqi casualties during the ground campaign
Probably the most important concluding note is:
First, the United States and its allies should not overestimate the effectiveness of air attacks and undertake offensive military operations with the expectation that air power will provide a cheap victory