Al Qaeda Won? Projection in Foreign Policy Analysis
In this Foreign Policy article Stephen Marche puts forwards the bold claim that "Al Qaeda Won." Or, more specifically, they have "definitively won the battle for the American mind."
I thought this was a very good article and it's hard to contest it on many straight factual or conceptual grounds. It raises the concept of diathetics, and how al Qaeda won by changing the narrative or the definition of victory. Diathetics is understood as the "battle for the stories people tell and for the public consciousness that emerges out of the stories that people tell."
The concept of diathetics has clear overlap with ideas in constructivism or critical geopolitics, and it emphasises the interpretative nature of warfare.
Diathetical warfare is a struggle for meaning. In the case of 9/11, that struggle began instantly, and it continues to this day. The terrorists manufactured, as they intended, a spectacle of interrelated images. These were created not just by traditional media but also by individuals sharing media over the internet
But with many of these articles that declare 'Al Qaeda Won,' and especially for this one, there is irony in the definition of victory being used as one defined by an American. You would think that an article all about socially constructed ideas of victory could be a little bit more critical of its own definition of al Qaeda victory. For example:
For the cost of the lives of 19 terrorists, al Qaeda sparked the global war on terrorism, with its subsequent $2.1 trillion cost and the loss of thousands of American lives. More importantly, they changed the way America thought of itself and the way the world thought of America... They convinced America that the only way to protect itself from this threat was to suspend civil liberties. Seventeen years later, America is stumbling back from the Middle East, believed by its own people and by the rest of the world to be a defeated occupier.
Without a doubt, 9/11 was extremely cost effective. It was a devastating blow that furthered al Qaeda's agenda. But killing Americans and having them spend money wasn't the end, it was a means to an end. Damaging the United States' image isn't the final purpose of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda doesn't care about civil liberties, at least not beyond the extent it helps or hinders their actual goals. Dragging the US into a war of attrition was the strategy not the goal.
Al Qaeda had concrete goals - in multiple statements, leaders like Zawahiri have consistently presented a series of objectives that al Qaeda is actively pursuing: liberating all "Muslim lands" from occupation by both non-Muslims and "apostate" rulers; imposing their version of sharia (Islamic law) on Muslims and non-Muslims alike in these lands; erecting then a state that they call the "caliphate;" and eventually making God’s word the highest.
The US still has a presence in Iraq, in Syria, and on the Arabian peninsula. These countries are led by governments in partnership, not opposed, to the US. Al Qaeda has been fractured, and its franchises are more disconnected than ever with increasingly nationalist agendas. The establishment of a caliphate in Syria came from a competitor to al Qaeda, and it lost influence as local groups cut ties to al Qaeda's centre. The attempts to establish a caliphate in Yemen and the Maghreb both failed. Al Qaeda, while still remaining in existence, is largely defeated in Iraq. It's making a bit of a comeback in Yemen as focus shifted to the Houthis, but how long term will that be? Even following America's defeat in Afghanistan (years after this article was posted) Al Qaeda's position in Afghanistan is worse now than in 2000. Al Qaeda is no closer to securing Kashmir or the Caucasus.
The article asks: "what could be better for [bin Laden] than to be as beautiful and free as an Old West outlaw wanted dead or alive?" Do we want to suggest that LARPing bandito was bin Laden's real priority? Not, perhaps, wanting to live to see his caliphate?
With a little more hindsight [adding this in 2024] we can look at Zawahiri, now drone-striked by America, and his legacy. One analyst summed it up as follows:
Zawahiri’s Death Is Anticlimactic to Al Qaeda’s Demise: His moves as leader of the shrinking group were watched more by analysts than by jihadists... Zawahiri stopped being relevant years ago. During his decadelong tenure at the helm of the international terrorist group, he managed to lose control of two of the key jihadist franchises because he was unable to mediate differences between them... His group of jihadist elders has been hollowed out, and many of its former supporters either grew suspicious of its links to countries like Iran or frustrated with its inability to lead... Over the years, his pompous public statements became something of a morbid comedy even within extremist circles... The group is now nonexistent in both Iraq and Syria, once its heartlands. What a track record for a genius and shrewd leader, right? ... Al Qaeda under Zawahiri could not keep its own branches, much less grow and steer the ship of jihad...
Does this sound like a victory from the perspective of al Qaeda? Does it sounds like they have won "the battle for hearts and minds?"
To summarise my point: just because America didn't 'win' doesn't mean that al Qaeda did.
Note: I originally wrote this in 2018. I am reposting it here with some minor edits and additions because I think it is a useful case for looking at the benefits of constructivism but also the dangers of projection while doing so.