Neoliberal International Relations
In this post I would like to just provide a quick overview of neoliberal international relations theory, as I understand it. I see neoliberal IR resting upon three pillars, that map somewhat neatly onto Kant's three in Perpetual Peace: namely, Democratic Peace Theory, Free Trade, and Institutions
Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) in short is the idea that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another. This should carry the caveat that democracy is not a binary, and so the more democratic two nations are, the less likely they will be to go to war with one another.
I've seen a number of comments around the web claim that DPT is a "joke" or "not taken seriously" or debunked. I'm honestly not quite sure where this view comes from. Contrary to this, multiple modern studies have labelled it an "empirical law" [1] [2]
The central thesis has been repeatedly verified empirically. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Even under criticism and scrutiny (of which there is plenty), academics find in favour of DPT. For example
The ādemocratic peaceāāthe inference that democracies rarely fight each otherāis one of the most important and empirically robust findings in international relations (IR). This article surveys the statistical challenges to the democratic peace and critically analyzes a prominent recent critique ( Gartzke 2007 ). Gartzke's claim that capitalist dynamics explain away the democratic peace relies on results problematically driven by (1) the censoring from the sample of observations containing certain communist countries or occurring before 1966, (2) the inclusion of regional controls, and (3) a misspecification of temporal controls. Analysis of these issues contributes to broader methodological debates and reveals novel characteristics of the democratic peace. Gartzke and other critics have contributed valuably to the study of IR; however, the democratic peace remains one of the most robust empirical associations in IR.
So how why does the DPT work? There are two main explanations:
- Normative - democratic norms make democracies more peaceful than other regime types in general. This is because democracies value debate, compromise and the peaceful transfer of power. [Book making this argument] [Review of book] [Another book]
- Institutional - the actual structure of democracies make them less like to go to war with another. There have been a few different explanations for this. For example, democracies impose costs on democratic leaders who choose to use force to solve international disputes, and they impede a democracies capacity to wage war without broad consent. Similarly, because of these large costs citizens can impose on their leaders, when democratic leaders choose to escalate international crises, their threats are taken as highly credible. In disputes between liberal states, the credibility of their bargaining signals allows them to negotiate a peaceful settlement before mobilization. Another idea is that democracies have less rent-seeking, meaning there is less incentive for territorial expansion or war waging (an example here is that many oil contracts in Iraq went to Chinese companies - the incentive for the Iraq War cannot be easily explained as a simple economic decision by political elites). [9] [10]
Free Trade
Also known as Capitalist Peace Theory, or the Golden Arches Theory (no two countries with a McDonalds had been at war, until unfortunately Russia invaded Georgia in 2008). This is the idea that market-oriented, capitalist societies are less likely to engage in war with one another. Once again, this general theory has been largely accepted by the field [11] [12] [13] [14] [15])
There are some important and debated nuances. For example, while bilateral trade seems strongly correlated with peace, as trade is diversified and becomes more multilateral, the impact is lessened. [Just one example] However, it seems generally true that a statement such as "increased trade between the US and China will have a pacifying effect" is true.
Like DPT there are different explanations for this:
- Cost-Benefit - simply put, going to war with your trade partner will disrupt your trade and you will lose your benefits from this trade.
- Institutional - one example is that free trade, and not just trade, promotes peace by removing an important foundation of domestic privilegeāprotective barriers to international commerceāthat enhances the domestic power of societal groups likely to support war, reduces the capacity of free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign policy, and simultaneously generates political support for the state often used to build its war machine. [See here for this one specifically]
- Normative - similar to DPT, free trade creates norms around cooperation and a focus on solving disputes legally and preferably mutually beneficially.
A quick aside, WW1 is often brought up as a failure of economic interdependence in stopping war. This is normally in reference to The Great Illusion, published in 1910 which argued "the economic cost of war was so great that no one could possibly hope to gain by starting a war the consequences of which would be so disastrous." It looks pretty bad in hindsight. However, it is important to note that the trigger for WW1 was in a very non-integrated area of Europe [15], and as mentioned in an above source, there is a difference between trade and free trade, and the very extensive use of tariffs and protectionism in the lead up to WW1 may have helped fuel the crisis.
Institutions
For as much as everyone loves to dunk on the UN as being useless, there is again good reason to believe that involvement in international organisations helps to foster peace and prosperity, often by helping facilitate the above two planks of our neoliberal platform. [16] [17] [18] [19]. For example, this paper finds that the pacifying effect of trade is mitigated if you are not within the institutionalised framework of a preferential trade agreement. Under neoliberal institutional theory, as outlined by Keohane the State is still at the centre of international relations analysis, however there is the acknowledgement that state action is carried out by and through institutions. International institutions can therefore impact the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate, the ability of government's to monitor others' compliance and to make credible commitments, and expectations on the solidity of international agreements.
There are four general views of institutionalism in political science:
- Rational Choice - states are rational actors who can pursue their interests and follow their preferences within political institutions, which define incentive structures. This is largely the view of "Neoliberal" Institutionalists such as Keohane.
- Historical - institutions may be created for some particular purpose, but people will become entrenched in them. Institutions develop over time following a "logic of path-dependence". Here you could for example look again to NATO and how its purpose shifted following the Cold War. People still existed within the structure, even if the raison d'etre had largely disappeared.
- Sociological - political institutions are socially constituted and culturally framed, with political agents acting according to a ālogic of appropriatenessā that follows from culturally-specific rules and norms.
- Discursive - focuses on the discourse that actors engage in the process of generating, deliberating, and/or legitimizing ideas about political action in institutional context according to a ālogic of communication.ā
Concluding Remarks
I believe this trinity of democracy, free trade, and institutions are a useful guiding principle for organising international affairs. If realism (and its offshoots) fairly accurately describes States caught up in security dilemmas and game theories, neoliberalism provides us with the tools and prescriptions on how to address this.