Strategic Culture
I think a useful way to understand the usefulness of constructivist approaches to international relations is to look at more practical and specific applications, such as the concept of Strategic Culture.
Strategic Culture is the beliefs and assumptions made that impact countriesâ decisions to go to war, and related questions such as whether they prefer offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of war, and what amount of casualties would be acceptable in a war. Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols, argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors and the like, that establishes pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences, and clothes these conceptions with an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. Strategic culture, in short, questions the neorealist assumption that states are purely rational and purports that what appears to be rational differs among states.
Iran is a good example to give when it comes to using a constructivist framework. There are three key aspects of Iran that have shaped its strategic culture: its Shia theocratic government, its revolutionary foundations, and the impact of the Iran-Iraq War. Khomeini saw the international system as a struggle between the Mustakberin, the arrogant ruling elites in third world countries and the major world powers, and the Mustazafin, the downtrodden and exploited masses. Khomeini believed that God would help the Mustazafin rise up and overthrow the Mustakberin. The Iranian revolution was a part of this movement, and it was perceived in terms of an Islamic revival overthrowing Western colonialism. Under this ideology, Iran and Shia Islam are made one and the same. The survival of the regime is an ultimate service to Islam, and the regime is embodiment of Shia Islamâs authority on Earth and represents the will of God.
Of equal import is how this syncretised with the revolutionary foundation of the Republic. As Napoleon sought to export the French revolution, and the Soviet Union sought to export socialist revolutions, Iran also sought to export its revolution. The revolution's new constitution established the revolution as a global movement of all oppressed nations against âarrogant powers.' The constitution provides the basis for a permanent revolution and the support for Islamic movements to pave the way for establishing an integrated global Ommat. To this end, Iran cancelled its tacit alliances with the monarchical regimes on the Gulf, accusing the emirs, sheikhs and kings of being corrupt, repressive, puppets of the West and hostile to Islam. Iran removed its military from Oman, which was assisting Sultan Qaboos with the Dhofar Insurgency, and provided sanctuary to revolutionary Shiite groups that sought the overthrow of the Arab regimes. Iranâs revolutionary zeal alienated itself from the international community, and isolated Iran had to focus on becoming self-sustaining. Part of this process was the mass mobilisation and radicalisation of the masses, and forming of an ideologically driven army â the Revolutionary Guard.
The nature of revolutionary Shi'ism was deeply entrenched due to the outbreak of war with Iraq. The Iran-Iraq War, described as the âThird Worldâs first Great Warâ, saw 1.2 million dead, 2.2 million wounded, 1.5 million internally displaced refugees, 157 Iranian towns damaged or destroyed and an additional 1800 villages annihilated. It saw huge losses in oil revenue, declining GDPs, mass material destruction and enormous social costs. The support of Western nations for Saddam was viewed by Tehran as conclusive evidence that the West was determined to strangle the revolution. The only way to defend the revolution was the total mobilisation of every able-bodied man and woman. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that âan Islamic country must be military in every respect.â During the war, Iran demonstrated a clear willingness to accept great costs to sustain and expand the Revolution. However, the horrific losses suffered by Iran has appeared to make the current military leadership cautious of military adventurism. The other lesson it taught the military, on the other hand, was the effect channelling revolutionary, religious and nationalist zeal could achieve. Although the export of revolution is still important, it may take a form other than 'the road to Jerusalem is led through Baghdad,' and the support of specific proxies would become more important.
Iranian strategic culture is therefore very different to other nations' strategic culture, and this has to be taken into account in geostrategic thinking. For example, one would expect far, far greater resistance from Iran in an American invasion than Iraq gave, or many other hypothetical states would give (e.g. Saudi Arabia) not just from a technical military hardware standpoint or manpower statistics, but due to the willpower to fight, the willingness to suffer great casualties, and the mass mobilisation of all segments of society.